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The Supreme Court of South Carolina 
Re: Hurricane Matthew 
 
 
ORDER 
On October 4, 2016, the Governor of South Carolina directed the closure of State, 
County and Municipal Government Offices in twenty-six counties in South 
Carolina from October 5 through October 7, 2016.1  This action was taken to 
facilitate the planned evacuations necessary due to Hurricane Matthew.  As the 
administrative head of the Unified Judicial System in South Carolina, the Chief 
Justice directed all levels of the Judicial System to comply with this closure.   
Subsequently, the Governor issued Executive Orders providing for evacuations in 
Jasper, Beaufort, Colleton, Charleston, Dorchester, Berkeley, Georgetown and 
Horry Counties.2  Several hundred thousand South Carolina citizens evacuated 
these areas, and the impacts of these evacuations were felt in counties which were
not subject to any closure or evacuation.  Further, Hurricane Matthew caused 
significant damage in South Carolina, and this will adversely affect the ability of 
many lawyers and litigants to comply with deadlines in court proceedings through 
the end of this week. 
Accordingly, this Court finds it appropriate to declare the days of Wednesday, 
October 5, 2016, though Friday, October 14, 2016, to be statewide "holidays" for 
the purposes of computing time under Rule 263 of the South Carolina Appellate 
Court Rules, Rule 6 of the South Carolina Rules Civil Procedure, Rule 35 of the 
1 Executive Order 2016-29.
2 Executive Orders 2016-31, - 32 and -33. 
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South Carolina Rules of Criminal Procedure, and Rule 3 of the South Carolina 
Rules of Magistrates Court.3
          s/ Costa M. Pleicones C.J. 
s/ Donald W. Beatty J. 
          s/ John W. Kittredge J. 
          s/ Kaye G. Hearn     J. 
s/ John Cannon Few J. 
Columbia, South Carolina 
October 10, 2016 
3 Monday, October 10, 2016, is already a holiday under these rules since it is a 
federal holiday. 
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THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA 

In The Supreme Court 

Thomas Chad Hilton, Claimant, Petitioner, 
v. 
Flakeboard America Limited, Employer, and Liberty 
Mutual Insurance Company, Carrier, Defendants, 
Respondents. 
Appellate Case No. 2015-000493 
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF APPEALS 
Appeal from the South Carolina Workers' Compensation 

Commission 

Opinion No. 27670 

Heard January 13, 2016 – Filed October 12, 2016 

 VACATED AND REMANDED 
Andrew Nathan Safran, of Columbia, for Petitioner. 
Lawson Brenn Watson and Ian Charles Gohean, both of 
Willson Jones Carter & Baxley, P.A., of Greenville, for 
Respondents. 
Gary Christmas, of Howell and Christmas, of Mt. 
Pleasant; Stephen Samuels, of Samuels Law Firm, of 
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Columbia; Michelle Powers, of Powers Law, of 
Greenwood; Ronald J. Jebaily and Suzanne H. Jebaily, 
both of Jebaily Law Firm, of Florence; Andrea Roche, of 
Mickle and Bass, of Columbia; John S. Nichols and 
Blake A. Hewitt, both of Bluestein Nichols Thompson 
and Delgado, of Columbia; Mary E. Jordan, of Hilton 
Head Island; David Pearlman, of The Steinberg Law 
Firm, of Charleston; and Linda McKenzie, of Bowen 
McKenzie Bowen, of Greenville, all for Amicus Curiae, 
Injured Workers' Advocates. 
CHIEF JUSTICE PLEICONES:  We granted certiorari to review an order of the 
Court of Appeals dismissing Petitioner Thomas Hilton's appeal of an admittedly 
interlocutory order of the South Carolina Workers' Compensation Commission's 
Appellate Panel (the Commission). Hilton v. Flakeboard America Ltd., S.C. Ct. 
App. Order dated Sept. 19, 2014. Hilton contends the Commission's interlocutory 
order vacating and remanding the Workers' Compensation Commission's single 
commissioner's (single commissioner) order is immediately appealable pursuant to 
S.C. Code Ann. § 1-23-380(A) (Supp. 2015). Section 1-23-380(A) states, in 
relevant part, that "a preliminary, procedural, or intermediate agency action or 
ruling is immediately reviewable if review of the final agency decision would not 
provide an adequate remedy."  We agree, under these unusual facts, that review of 
the final agency decision would not provide Hilton with an adequate remedy, and 
he is therefore entitled to an immediate appeal. Determining whether review of the 
final agency decision would give Hilton an adequate remedy requires us to reach 
the underlying merits of the Commission's order, and since we conclude that the 
order cannot stand, we vacate the Court of Appeals' order and remand the matter to 
the Commission. On remand, the Commission will limit consideration to 
Respondent Flakeboard's 102 specific exceptions to the single commissioner's 
order. 
FACTS
Hilton suffered an admittedly compensable injury as the result of an insect or 

spider bite. The present dispute concerns whether he required further medical 
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treatment to reach maximum medical improvement (MMI).  The single 
commissioner agreed with Hilton on the merits, finding he had not reached MMI, 
and further that any misrepresentations he had made during the life of his claim 
were a result of a serious cognitive deficit from a previous brain injury.  
Flakeboard appealed to the Commission raising four "General Exceptions" and 102 
specific exceptions to the single commissioner's order.  The four "General 
Exceptions" raised the issues of MMI, temporary disability, Hilton's entitlement to 
further medical treatment, and Hilton's credibility. Neither the four general 
exceptions nor the 102 specific exceptions raised issues of competency, the 
appointment of a Guardian ad Litem, or any claim that Flakeboard had been denied 
its right to have Hilton evaluated by a physician of its choice. 
Following a hearing, the Commission—without observing Hilton— issued an 
order that first reproduced the single commissioner's order, then recited a 
paragraph entitled "Issues on Appeal," and finally concluded with these findings by 
the Commission: 
FINDINGS OF THE FULL COMMISSION 
This matter was heard before the above-mentioned 
[Commission] during the last term of Review.  The 
[Commission] considered the matter and Vacate[s] and 
Remand[s] the Decision and Order to [the single 
commissioner] to determine whether or not [Hilton] is 
competent to testify and whether or not [Hilton] needs a 
Guardian ad Litem pursuant to §42-15-55.  They [sic] also 
order [Flakeboard] to send [Hilton] to a neurologist of [its]
choice for an evaluation as to the causation and extent of 
[Hilton]'s problems. 
ORDER 
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that this matter is Vacated 
and Remanded to the [single commissioner] for the purposes 
of making a determination as to whether or not [Hilton] is 
competent to testify and whether or not [Hilton] needs a 
Guardian ad Litem pursuant to §42-15-55.  It is also Ordered 
that [Flakeboard] send [Hilton] to a neurologist of [its] choice 
17 

                                         
 
 
for an evaluation as to the causation and extent of [Hilton's] 
problems. Such evaluation shall be made available to the 
[single commissioner] for his or her consideration. 
 
AND SO IT IS ORDERED! 
 
(emphasis in original). 
 
Hilton appealed the Commission's decision to the Court of Appeals. The Court of 
Appeals dismissed the appeal as not immediately appealable under S.C. Code Ann. 
§ 1-23-380(A). This grant of certiorari followed. 
 
 
 
ISSUE 
 
Did the Court of Appeals err in dismissing Hilton's appeal 
under S.C. Code Ann. § 1-23-380(A)? 
 
ANALYSIS 
Hilton argues the Court of Appeals erred in dismissing his appeal because the 
Commission's order was immediately appealable under section 1-23-380(A). We 
agree. We decide the merits of Hilton's challenge to the Commission's order and 
vacate the Court of Appeals' order and remand to the Commission with orders to 
only address the issues preserved in Flakeboard's Form 30. 
Appeals from administrative agencies are governed by the Administrative 
Procedures Act. Bone v. U.S. Food Service, 404 S.C. 67, 76, 744 S.E.2d 552, 557 
(2013). Section 1-23-380(A) of the APA states a "preliminary, procedural, or 
intermediate agency action or ruling is immediately reviewable if review of the 
final agency decision would not provide an adequate remedy."1 This Court has held 
1 The concurring opinion maintains that "the result the Court reaches today is 
directly contrary to" the decision in Bone. Bone, a plurality opinion, defined the 
issue it was addressing as "the meaning of a "final judgment" under [a prior 
version of S.C. Code Ann.] section 1-23-390," whereas the issue in this case is the 
meaning of the exception to a "final agency decision" in § 1-23-380(A). These two 
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that whether an intermediate action or ruling is immediately reviewable is to be 
decided on a case-by-case basis i.e., whether a review of the final decision would 
not provide an adequate remedy. The Island Packet v. Kittrell, 365 S.C. 332, 339, 
617 S.E.2d 730, 734 (2005) (interpreting identical language in a previous version 
of section 1-23-380).
Only issues raised to the Commission within the application for review of the 
single commissioner's order are preserved for review. Ham v. Mullins Lumber Co., 
193 S.C. 66, 7 S.E.2d 712 (1952) (holding that all findings of fact and law by the 
Hearing Commissioner became and are the law of the case, unless within the scope 
of the appellant's exception to the Full Commission); Brunson v. American Koyo 
Bearings, 367 S.C. 161, 165, 623 S.E.2d 870, 872 (Ct. App. 2005) (holding that 
the findings of fact and law by the single commissioner become and are the law of 
the case unless excepted to by appellant) abrogated in part on other grounds by 
Bone v. U.S. Food Service, 404 S.C. 67, 744 S.E.2d 552 (2013); Green v. City of 
Columbia, 311 S.C. 78, 80, 427 S.E.2d 685 (Ct. App. 1993) (holding the findings 
of fact and law by the single commissioner become the law of the case, unless 
within the scope of the appellant's exception to the single commissioner's order)
abrogated in part on other grounds by Bone v. U.S. Food Service, 404 S.C. 67, 744 
S.E.2d 552 (2013). This Court has also held that general exceptions, such as "the 
commission erred in making an award," are too ambiguous to fulfill the notice 
requirements of due process and do not preserve an issue for review. See Jones v. 
Anderson Cotton Mills, 205 S.C. 247, 31 S.E.2d 447 (1944). 
The Commission has further emphasized the importance of including all appealed 
issues in the Form 30 through its own regulations. Each party "shall arrange and 
present all evidence at the hearing." 8 S.C. Code Ann. Regs. 67-613(A) (2012). 
And when a party decides to appeal the decision of the single commissioner: 
(3) The grounds for appeal must be set out in detail on the Form 30 in the 
form of questions presented. 
statutes, in addition to using different terminology, govern appealability in two 
different situations. Section 1-23-390, along with Rule 242, SCACR, govern this 
Court's review of a final decision by an intermediate judicial tribunal, while § 1-
23-380 defines the circumstances under which a judicial body may review an 
agency decision. See, e.g., Shatto v. McLeod Reg. Med. Center, 406 S.C. 470, 753 
S.E.2d 416 (2013) fn. 2. 
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(a) Each question presented must be concise and concern one finding 
of fact, conclusion of law, or other proposition the appellant 
believes is in error. 
 
8 S.C. Code Ann. Regs. 67-701 (2012). 
Under these unique circumstances where the Commission has ordered the 
relitigation of the entire dispute without regard to the matters raised by the 
appealing party, we find that requiring Hilton to wait until the final agency 
decision to appeal would not provide him an adequate remedy. Prior to the 
Commission's order, no issue regarding Hilton's competency had been raised by 
the attorneys for any party,2 by the single commissioner who observed Hilton's live 
testimony, or by the medical experts who evaluated him. The Commission, 
nonetheless, without the benefit of personally observing Hilton, sua sponte raised 
the issues of competency, and potential appointment of a Guardian ad Litem. It 
further ex mero motu ordered Hilton to have his physical injuries evaluated by a 
physician of Flakeboard's choosing. Further, instead of simply remanding for a 
competency determination leaving open the possibility the single commissioner 
would find Hilton competent, it vacated the single commissioner's order; thus 
ordering both parties to begin anew, regardless of the ultimate competency 
determination. These extreme remedies, moreover, were ordered without any 
explanation from the Commission. 
As with competency, Flakeboard never sought to have Hilton seen by a doctor of 
its choosing. The Commission ex mero motu ordered Hilton to be seen by a doctor 
of Flakeboard's choosing to determine the cause of his physical injuries. To be 
sure, S.C. Code Ann. § 42-17-30 (2015) 3 and S.C. Code Ann. § 42-15-80 (2015) 4  
2 Flakeboard's claim that its four general exceptions raised these issues to the 
Commission is contrary to this Court's jurisprudence. Each issue raised to the 
Commission must be done with specificity, not through blanket general exceptions. 
Further, we find no evidence in this record that Flakeboard was concerned with 
Hilton's competency or the need for an additional medical examination. Ham v. 
Mullins Lumber Co., 193 S.C. 66, 7 S.E.2d 712 (1952) (holding unchallenged 
findings of the single commissioner became the law of the case).
3 Section 42-17-30 states, in pertinent part, "The commission or any member 
thereof may, upon the application of either party or upon its own motion, appoint a 
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grant the Commission the authority to require Hilton to be evaluated by a physician 
of its choosing. But instead, the Commission ordered Flakeboard "to send [Hilton]
to a neurologist of their choice . . . ," despite no such request being made by 
Flakeboard under either statute. The Commission's order furthermore gives no 
explanation why further medical evaluation is required; a decision effectively 
granting Flakeboard a "do over" of the entire litigation.   
Under these extraordinary circumstances, we are convinced that the standard set by 
section 1-23-380(A) has been met. The facts of this case—where the Commission 
has in effect ordered a new trial without regard to the matters raised by the 
appealing party and without any explanation why such an extreme remedy is 
appropriate—convince us that requiring Hilton to wait to appeal until the final 
agency decision would not provide an adequate remedy. If under the circumstances 
presented here, the Commission's order is allowed to stand, a party could face the 
possibility of repeated unexplained "do overs" before a final decision of the 
Commission. We caution that circumstances such as these that will permit the 
immediate appeal of an interlocutory administrative decision under section 1-23-
380(A) "are about as rare as the proverbial hens' teeth."  State v. Lytchfield, 230 
S.C. 405, 409, 95 S.E.2d 857, 859 (1957) (referring to appellate reversals of denial 
of continuance motions).
CONCLUSION 
We vacate the Court of Appeals' order dismissing Hilton's appeal and remand the 
matter to the Commission for consideration only of Flakeboard's 102 specific 
exceptions to the single commissioner's order raised in the Form 30. 
disinterested and duly qualified physician or surgeon to make any necessary 
medical examination of any employee and to testify in respect thereto." 
4 Section 42-15-80 states, "After an injury and so long as he claims compensation, 
the employee, if so requested by his employer or ordered by the commission, shall 
submit himself to examination, at reasonable times and places, by a qualified 
physician or surgeon designated and paid by the employer or commission."
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 VACATED AND REMANDED. 
 
 
Acting Justice James E. Moore, concurs.  BEATTY, J., 
concurring in result only.  KITTREDGE, J., concurring in a 
separate opinion in which HEARN, J., concurs.  
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 JUSTICE KITTREDGE:  I concur in result but write separately to note my view 
that the result the Court reaches today is directly contrary to this Court's decision in 
Bone v. U.S. Food Service, 404 S.C. 67, 744 S.E.2d 552 (2013).  I joined the 
dissent in Bone, and I remain firmly convinced that Bone was wrongly decided and 
should be overruled. The majority maintains that this case is distinguishable from 
Bone because "the issue in this case is the meaning of the exception to a 'final 
agency decision' in § 1-23-380(A)."  Specifically, the majority cites to the 
provision in section 1-23-380 that states, "A preliminary, procedural, or 
intermediate agency action or ruling is immediately reviewable if review of the 
final agency decision would not provide an adequate remedy."  S.C. Code Ann. 
§ 1-23-380 (Supp. 2015). The majority correctly finds "that review of the final 
agency decision would not provide Hilton with an adequate remedy, and he is 
therefore entitled to an immediate appeal."  But I respectfully disagree with the 
suggestion that Bone and this case involve "two different situations," for the 
petitioners in Bone made the identical argument based on section 1-23-380 as that 
made by Hilton, i.e., that review of a final agency decision would not provide an 
adequate remedy.  The Court rejected that argument in Bone, where it was far more 
compelling than it is in this case.  See Bone, 404 S.C. at 74, 744 S.E.2d at 556 
(concluding, after the circuit court ruled the employee–respondent suffered a 
compensable injury as a matter of law, that review of the Workers' Compensation 
Commission's final decision would provide the petitioners with an adequate 
remedy).    
 
 
HEARN, J. concurs. 
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CHIEF JUSTICE PLEICONES: Petitioner Alexander L. Hunsberger (Alex) was 
sentenced to thirty-three years' incarceration for his part in the murder of Samuel 
Sturrup. Alex argued on appeal that the trial judge erred in denying his speedy 
trial motion. The Court of Appeals affirmed. State v. Hunsberger, Op. No. 2014-
UP-381 (S.C. Ct. App. filed Nov. 5, 2014).  We granted Alex's petition for a writ 
of certiorari to review the Court of Appeals' decision, and now reverse. 
The acts that led to Alex's prosecution for murder are heinous.  Sturrup allegedly 
stole money from Steven Barnes,1 the purported head of a robbery and prostitution 
ring in Georgia. In an effort to force Sturrup to divulge where the stolen money 
was located, Barnes allegedly beat, and caused others to beat, Sturrup at a location 
in Augusta, Georgia.  Sturrup was then placed in the trunk of a vehicle and brought 
from Georgia to South Carolina by Alex and his brother Julio Hunsberger.2 
Sturrup was taken into a field and shot by several individuals including the 
Hunsberger brothers. Barnes is alleged to have fired the fatal shot.  
In January 2002, Alex was arrested in South Carolina and in March 2002, he was 
indicted for the murder of Sturrup.  In June 2002, Alex's request for bail was 
denied and his renewed request was denied in April 2004.  In November 2004, 
Alex moved for an order requiring the State to try him during the next two terms of 
court, or if no trial were held, that he be released on bail, citing S.C. Code Ann. § 
17-23-90 (2014)3 and the state and federal constitutional guarantees of due process 
and speedy trial. While this motion was denied in December 2004, the circuit 
court judge found the delay "clearly bordering on the excessive" and admonished 
1 Steven Barnes' capital conviction was reversed on direct appeal.  State v. Barnes, 
407 S.C. 27, 753 S.E.2d 545 (2014).
2 Julio's conviction is also being set aside on speedy trial grounds in an opinion 
filed today. State v. Hunsberger, Op No. 2016-MO-029(S.C. Sup. Ct. filed 
October 12, 2016).
3 This statute is derived from Section 7 of the Habeas Corpus Act of 1679. See 1 
Statutes at Large 117, 119-120.  Section 17-23-90 provides that, upon demand, a 
prisoner who is not indicted or tried by the second term following the demand be 
released without bail. E.g., State v. Campbell, 277 S.C. 408, 288 S.E.2d 395 
(1982). 
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the State to either try Alex or release him to Georgia which had placed a hold on 
him.
In an effort to resolve the case, Judge Keesley offered to seek a special February 
2005 term of court to allow the State to try Alex then, but the solicitor declined.  
Following notification that the State would not go forward with Alex's trial, in 
January 2005 Judge Keesley granted Alex bail but ordered him held unless 
Georgia released its hold. Alex was subsequently extradited to Georgia, and in 
September 2006, he was convicted there of kidnapping with bodily injury of 
Sturrup, and sentenced to life imprisonment.  While imprisoned in Georgia, Alex 
repeatedly declined to be a witness against Steven Barnes in Barnes' South 
Carolina death penalty case.  Barnes was tried and convicted in November 2010.
In early 2011, Alex was extradited to South Carolina. In January 2012, the State 
called Alex's case for trial and Alex moved for dismissal of his charges, claiming 
his state and federal rights to a speedy trial had been violated.  The motion was 
denied, as was his renewed request made at mid-trial.   
ISSUE 
Did the Court of Appeals err in affirming the trial court's denial 
of Alex's motion to dismiss his charges under both the United 
States and South Carolina Constitutions due to a violation of his 
right to a speedy trial? 
ANALYSIS
Alex argues that his right to a speedy trial under both the United States and South 
Carolina Constitutions was violated, and therefore, his murder charge should be 
dismissed. We analyze the issue under the Sixth Amendment, and agree. 
The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides, "In all criminal 
prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial."  U.S. 
Const. amend. VI. Similarly, the South Carolina Constitution provides that "Any 
person charged with an offense shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial."  
S.C. Const. art. I, § 14. A speedy trial means a trial without unreasonable and 
unnecessary delay. State v. Langford, 400 S.C. 421, 441, 735 S.E.2d 471, 482 
(2012) (quoting Wheeler v. State, 247 S.C. 393, 400, 147 S.E.2d 627, 630 (1966)).  
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The remedy for a speedy trial violation is dismissal of the charges.  Langford, 400 
S.C. at 442, 735 S.E.2d at 482 (internal citation omitted).  The trial court's ruling 
on a motion for speedy trial is reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard. Id. 
at 442, 735 S.E.2d at 482 (internal citation omitted).  An abuse of discretion occurs 
when the court's decision is based on an error of law or upon factual findings that 
are without evidentiary support.  Id. at 442, 735 S.E.2d at 482 (internal citation 
omitted).   
 
An accused's speedy trial right begins when he is "indicted, arrested, or otherwise 
officially accused."  Langford, 400 S.C. at 442, 735 S.E.2d at 482 (citing United 
States v. MacDonald, 456 U.S. 1, 6 (1982)). To trigger a speedy trial analysis, the 
accused must allege that the interval between accusation and trial has crossed 
the threshold dividing ordinary from "presumptively prejudicial" delay, since, by 
definition, he cannot complain that the government has denied him a "speedy" trial 
if it has, in fact, prosecuted his case with customary promptness.  Doggett v. U.S., 
505 U.S. 647, 652 (1992).  Presumptively prejudicial delay exists when an 
accused is not prosecuted with ordinary promptness.  See Doggett, 505 U.S. at 651-
52 (1992).  Once the accused has met this initial burden, a court must look to four 
factors, among the totality of the circumstances, to decide whether the defendant's 
right to a speedy trial has been denied.  Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 530-31 
(1972); see also Langford, 400 S.C. at 441, 735 S.E.2d at 482.  These factors are: 
(1) length of delay; (2) the reason for the delay; (3) the accused's assertion of his 
right to a speedy trial; and (4) whether the delay prejudiced the accused.  Barker at 
531-32. A speedy trial claim must be "analyzed in terms of the circumstances of 
each case, balancing the conduct of the prosecution and the defense."  State v. 
Pittman, 373 S.C. 527, 549, 647 S.E.2d 144, 155 (2008) (citing Barker, 407 U.S. at 
530). 
 
Because the timeline is essential to determining whether Alex was denied a speedy 
trial, the important dates are outlined below: 
 
 January 25, 2002: Arrest. 
 
 March 2002: Indictment 
 
 November 17, 2004: Alex makes first Speedy Trial motion. 
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	 December 2, 2004: Judge Keesley declines to release Alex on bail but 
admonishes the State to be prepared to try Alex in February 2005 
unless the solicitor notifies the court he will allow Georgia to take 
custody. Court order acknowledges problems arising from multiple 
defendants and different jurisdictions in addition to the possibility that 
South Carolina will seek the death penalty against Alex.  Judge
Keesley then writes: "However, Georgia has disposed of the cases 
involving the co-defendants over a year ago, and the court has 
instructed the Solicitor's office on at least two prior occasions that it 
must make a decision about whether to serve the death penalty 
notice." 
	 January 28, 2005: The State declines Judge Keesley's offer to try Alex 
during a special February 2005 term of Court; Judge Keesley grants 
Alex bail, subject to hold placed on him by Georgia. 
	 Early 2005: Alex is extradited to Georgia. 
	 September 12, 2006: Alex is convicted in Georgia of kidnapping 
Sturrup with bodily injury and sentenced to life imprisonment.  Alex 
appeals. 
	 November 2010: Barnes is convicted and sentenced to death in South 
Carolina. 
	 September 2011: Alex is made aware South Carolina is seeking his 
extradition. 
	 October 2011: Alex is extradited to South Carolina. 
	 January 3, 2012: Alex's murder case is called in South Carolina, and 
he makes a motion for dismissal based on the denial of his right to a 
speedy trial. He renews this motion after the State rests. 
In this case appellate review of the trial court's ruling is complicated by the court's 
failure to make specific findings, relying instead on general statements about the 
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complexity of the cases, problems involving multiple jurisdictions, and Alex's
failure to show actual prejudice.4 
A. Triggering Factor and Length of Delay 
The Court of Appeals held that the three-year period between Alex's arrest in 2002, 
and his release to Georgia in 2005, was sufficient to trigger the speedy trial 
analysis. State v. Hunsberger, Op. No. 2014-UP-381 (S.C. Ct. App. filed Nov. 5, 
2014). We agree. 
The Court of Appeals held that the three-year period between Alex's arrest5 and 
extradition to Georgia from South Carolina was sufficient to trigger further 
review.6  Alex argues that using three years instead of ten years is an error of law 
that affects the entire Court of Appeals' analysis. We hold, whether three years or 
ten years, the delay between Alex's arrest and trial meets the threshold requirement 
for a speedy trial claim, and requires an analysis of the four Barker factors. See 
4 We note our concern that both the trial court and the Court of Appeals seem to 
find an absence of prejudice since Alex "was not deprived of his liberty because he 
was incarcerated in Georgia under another sentence."  The dissent echoes this 
sentiment when it makes a factual finding that Alex's "pretrial incarceration and 
anxiety concerns were minimal."  We have searched the record for any evidence to 
support this statement, and have found none. Both of the lower tribunals ignored 
the Supreme Court's decision in Smith v. Hooey, 393 U.S. 374 (1969), and the 
dissent purportedly distinguishes it by citing to an unpublished federal district 
court opinion, which held that incarceration in one jurisdiction does not lessen the 
accused's constitutional right to a speedy trial on charges pending in another 
jurisdiction, noting "an outstanding untried charge . . . can have fully as depressive 
an effect upon a prisoner as upon a person who is at large."  Id. at 378. See also
Betterman v. Montana, 578 U.S. ____ (2016) fn. 5 (confirming Smith's holding).
5 The time period for speedy trial analysis begins with "formal accusation," which 
can be earlier than an accused's arrest. Langford, 400 S.C. at 442, 735 S.E.2d at 
482 (internal citation omitted).  Alex uses his arrest as the date his speedy trial 
right attached, and we do so as well.
6 The trial judge never explicitly stated that the delay here was sufficient to trigger 
the speedy trial analysis but instead proceeded to immediately analyze the question 
of prejudice. 
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Langford, 400 S.C. at 442-443, 735 S.E.2d at 482 (holding a twenty-three month 
delay was presumptively prejudicial) (internal citation omitted); State v. Cooper, 
386 S.C. 210, 687 S.E.2d 62 (Ct. App. 2009) (reaching the Barker factors when 
there was a forty-four month delay); State v. Waites, 270 S.C. 104, 240 S.E.2d 651 
(1978) (holding a twenty-eight month delay triggered speedy trial analysis).  
Having found that Alex satisfied the threshold standard, we turn now to a review of 
the four Barker factors we consider when analyzing a speedy trial claim: (1) length 
of delay; (2) reason for the delay; (3) defendant's assertion of his speedy trial right; 
and (4) prejudice to the defendant from the delay.  See State v. Reaves, 414 S.C. 
118, 777 S.E.2d 213 (2015).
We agree with the trial judge and with the Court of Appeals that the full ten-year 
delay between Alex's South Carolina arrest in 2002, and his South Carolina trial in 
2012, is not entirely attributable to the State. See Langford, 400 S.C. at 443, 735 
S.E.2d at 483 (holding that delays occasioned by the defendant weigh against him).  
The State should not bear responsibility for the time that Alex was awaiting trial in 
Georgia, for when a defendant violates the laws of multiple sovereigns, one 
jurisdiction must necessarily wait at the "prosecutorial turnstile."  See U.S. v. 
Grimmond, 137 F.3d 823, 828 (4th Cir. 1998).  Therefore, we hold the time from
the January 28, 2005 order requiring Alex's extradition to Georgia or his release on 
bail, until his Georgia conviction on September 12, 2006, should not be counted 
against the State. This reduces the ten-year period by approximately one year and 
seven months.  
It appears from the record that Alex did not affirmatively consent to extradition to 
South Carolina in 2011, and therefore delayed his trial by four months.  The State
argues Alex contested extradition by refusing to consent, although Alex testified 
that after being presented with the extradition form in September 2011 he sought 
advice from an attorney on the effect his consent would have on his pending 
Georgia appeal. For purposes of our analysis, we weigh the four-month delay in 
the extradition proceedings slightly against Alex.  Therefore, with the delay from 
Alex's Georgia proceedings and the extradition deducted from the total, the State is 
responsible for an eight-year delay between arrest and trial.  This extraordinary 
delay, during which time Alex was continuously in custody and for the most part 
available for trial in South Carolina, weighs heavily against the State.   
We turn next to the reasons given by the State for the delay. 
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B. Reasons for Delay
	
The State's justifications for delay in trying a defendant are weighted differently: 
(1) a deliberate attempt to delay trial as a means to hamper the defense weighs 
heavily against the State; (2) negligence or overcrowded dockets weigh less 
heavily against the State, but are ultimately its responsibility; (3) a valid reason, 
such as a missing witness, justifies an appropriate delay; and (4) delays occasioned 
by the accused weigh against him. Langford, 400 S.C. at 443, 735 S.E.2d at 483 
(internal citation omitted).  Ultimately, justifying the delay between charge and 
trial is the responsibility of the State. Langford, 400 S.C. at 443, 735 S.E.2d at 483 
(internal citation omitted).   
The trial court held the State gave legitimate reasons for the delay, pointing to the 
complexity of the cases and the problems involved in cross border prosecutions.  
The Court of Appeals did not specifically address the reasons for the State's delay, 
but held that under the totality of the circumstances, the trial court did not abuse its 
discretion.  State v. Hunsberger, Op. No. 2014-UP-381 (S.C. Ct. App. filed Nov. 5, 
2014). We find the reliance on complexity and cross border issues patently 
insufficient in this case in light of the findings of Judge Keesley in his December 
2004 order. 
To the extent the Court of Appeals upheld the trial court's ruling on the basis of 
"complexity," it erred.  There is no evidence that Alex's case, while serious, was 
complex.  See Langford, 400 S.C. at 442, 735 S.E.2d at 482 (making the distinction 
between complex and serious crimes).  Three individuals (other than Barnes and 
the Hunsberger brothers) were codefendants in the Georgia and South Carolina 
cases involving the beating of Sturrup in Georgia and his murder in South 
Carolina. These three eyewitnesses, who all testified against Alex in this January 
2012 trial, had pleaded guilty in Georgia by December 2003.  From at least that 
time forward, all three were available to law enforcement in South Carolina, and 
available to testify against Alex in South Carolina.  No new evidence was sought 
or discovered during the almost nine-year delay between their Georgia pleas and 
Alex's South Carolina trial.  This was not a complicated conspiracy that required 
years to unravel, instead, all of the evidence used to prosecute Alex for Sturrup's 
murder was known at the time of or shortly after Alex's arrest.  The lower courts 
erred in agreeing with the State that the "complexity" of Alex's case justified the 
delay. 
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The second reason the trial court found justified the delay in Alex's South Carolina 
trial was "the problems involved in cross-border prosecutions."  Again, we find no 
evidence in the record to support this finding.  The State had the opportunity to 
bring Alex to trial for three years before he was extradited to Georgia.  Moreover, 
the State waited another five years after Alex was convicted in Georgia to begin 
extradition proceedings. Excepting the year and eight months that Georgia took to 
try Alex's case, and the four months delay caused by Alex (allegedly) contesting 
extradition, the record does not demonstrate that "cross-border" issues had any 
bearing on the State's delay.  We find no evidence that the issues resulting from
Alex's prosecution in Georgia justified the lengthy delay of his South Carolina 
trial. 
The State now argues, and we agree, that "collecting" witnesses can be a legitimate 
reason for delay. The State, however, neither presented evidence that it was 
looking for additional witnesses in Alex's case nor did the trial judge make such a 
finding. The State seeks to distort this otherwise legitimate reason by applying it 
not to a witness, but instead to the defendant.  Alex was neither a "missing
witness" nor a witness that needed "collecting." Instead, he was at all times a 
prisoner in either South Carolina or Georgia.  The State admitted it delayed trying 
Alex in hopes he would agree to be a witness against Barnes in Barnes' South 
Carolina's capital trial, which itself did not take place until approximately nine 
years after Sturrup's skeletal remains were found in a South Carolina field.  The 
State's characterization of Alex as a witness needing to be "collected," or "missing" 
suggests its true reason for delay was its hope that Alex would be coerced by the 
delay in his trial into testifying against Barnes. See Barker, 407 U.S. at 531 n.32 
(indicating it is improper for the prosecution to intentionally delay to gain a tactical 
advantage over a defendant (internal citation omitted)).  The State's desire to have 
Alex testify against Barnes in South Carolina did not, under the circumstances 
present here, justify the delay in Alex's trial.  Further, that the State placed a higher 
priority on strengthening its case against Barnes than on bringing Alex's case to 
trial cannot, alone, justify the delay of Alex's trial.  The purpose of the right to a 
speedy trial is to vindicate a defendant's and society's interest in a speedy
resolution of cases. Barker at 519. This purpose is not served when the 
constitutional right of a low priority defendant is sacrificed in hopes that defendant 
will help the State in a higher priority trial.  Cf., Doggett, 505 U.S. at 657 (holding 
that condoning unjustifiable delays would encourage the government to gamble 
with the interests of those assigned a low prosecutorial priority).  The State's desire 
to present the strongest case against Barnes, especially when the three other 
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eyewitnesses who had pled guilty to the Georgia charges in 2003 were available 
and willing to testify against him, does not justify the delay in prosecuting Alex's
case. 
Finally, there is simply no evidence that the delay was the result of the State's
decision-making process whether to seek the death penalty against Alex.  The State 
does not assign a specific amount of delay to this decision, nor does it explain why 
this capital decision took such an especially long time.  Further, this purported 
reason is undermined by Judge Keesley's order issued in early December 2004, in 
which he wrote he had already "instructed the Solicitor's Office on at least two 
prior occasions that it must make a decision about whether to serve the death 
penalty notice [on Alex]."  While the decision to seek the death penalty must be 
weighed carefully by the State, here all facts necessary to such a decision were 
known to it well before December 2004.  There is simply no evidence that the 
State was actually debating the capital decision during the period between 
December 2004 and Alex's trial in January 2012.
The justifications advanced by the State for its delay are unsupported by the 
evidence, which in turn suggests that the State was using this murder charge as
leverage to coerce Alex's testimony in Barnes' capital trial.  The reasons for the 
delay is a factor that weighs heavily against the State. 
C. Accused's Assertion of the Right to a Speedy Trial
Whether a defendant previously asserted the right to a speedy trial is not alone 
dispositive of whether he is entitled to relief. See Barker, 407 U.S. at 533 (holding 
none of the four factors are either necessary or sufficient to find a denial of the 
right to a speedy trial). The accused's assertion of the right, however, is entitled 
strong evidentiary weight in determining whether the accused is being deprived of 
the right. Barker, 407 U.S. at 531-32.  Failure by the accused to assert the right 
will make it more difficult for the accused to carry his burden of proving that he 
was denied a speedy trial.  Id. at 532. 
The trial court did not specifically address Alex's assertions of his right to speedy 
trial, other than to note it had been almost five years since Alex was tried in 
Georgia. The Court of Appeals noted that Alex asserted his right three times. 
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It is undisputed that Alex moved for a speedy trial in November 2004 and twice 
during January 2012.  While the State argues that it is significant that Alex did not 
move for a speedy trial between January 2005 and January 2012, we hold that 
under the circumstances of this case, including the fact that Alex's appeal from his 
2006 Georgia conviction was still unresolved when the State sought extradition in 
2011, his failure to press his right during this period is understandable.  While 
Alex's assertion of his right to a speedy trial three times was sufficient to 
demonstrate Alex's desire for a speedy resolution of his charges, we find his seven-
year silence renders this factor largely neutral in our overall evaluation.  
D. Prejudice to the Accused 
The trial court held: 
the only way that prejudice can be determined in an instance like this is 
based on something you demonstrated if there's a trial. . . . prejudice 
[cannot] be assumed given the facts I have heard. . . .  Who knows what may 
develop during the course of the trial.  We may get some indication that the 
defendant's due process rights have been violated or right to a fair trial has 
been violated. Due to the length of time involved, but I believe that the— 
based on what I've heard the State has shown that it has acted properly under 
the circumstances and that the defendant has not shown any prejudice that 
might affect his right to a fair trial or his due process rights.
After the State presented its case, Alex renewed his motion for dismissal.  In 
making this midtrial motion, Alex pointed out specific discrepancies in the 
testimony of two of the three eyewitnesses between their earlier statements or 
testimony at earlier proceedings. 7  The trial court again denied the motion, stating 
Alex had not been prejudiced because the memories of the witnesses were "pretty 
vivid." The Court of Appeals held the trial court did not abuse its discretion in 
finding Alex did not demonstrate prejudice from the trial delay, speculating that 
Alex may have received a benefit from the delay because the State no longer 
sought the death penalty. State v. Hunsberger, Op. No. 2014-UP-381 (S.C. Ct. 
7 Most importantly, whether one or both of the Hunsberger brothers exited their car 
with a gun, and who was outside the car when Sturrup was forced in the 
Hunsbergers' car's trunk. 
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App. filed Nov. 5, 2014). We agree with Alex that these prejudice rulings are 
erroneous.
First, we note that the trial court's ruling was influenced by an error of law in so 
much as it rested on a belief that actual prejudice —to the exclusion of 
presumptive prejudice —was the only type of prejudice that would support a 
speedy trial claim.  In fact, an accused can assert actual prejudice or presumptive 
prejudice as the result of the State's violation of his right to a speedy trial.  Actual 
prejudice occurs when the trial delay has weakened the accused's ability to raise 
specific defenses, elicit specific testimony, or produce specific items of evidence.  
See Doggett, 505 U.S. at 655 (accepting the State's definition of actual prejudice).  
The United States Supreme Court also recognized that excessive delay 
presumptively compromises the reliability of a trial in ways that neither party can 
prove or even identify. Id (internal citation omitted).  This is so because "time's 
erosion of exculpatory evidence and testimony 'can rarely be shown.'" Doggett, 
505 U.S. at 655 (citing Barker, 407 U.S. at 532). When the government 
persistently fails to try an accused and the delay is excessive, the accused need not 
show actual prejudice in order to prevail in his speedy trial claim.  Doggett, 505 
U.S. at 657-58. While presumptive prejudice cannot alone support a speedy trial 
claim, it is part of the mix of relevant facts, and its importance increases with the 
length of time.  Doggett, 505 U.S. at 656 (internal citation omitted).  
We hold the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the trial court's failure to consider 
presumptive prejudice.  As the United States Supreme Court held, "When the 
Government's negligence . . . causes delay six times as long as that generally 
sufficient to trigger judicial review . . . and when the presumption of prejudice, 
albeit unspecified, is neither extenuated, as by the defendant's acquiescence, nor 
persuasively rebutted, the defendant is entitled to relief."  Doggett, 505 U.S. at 658 
(holding an accused's right to a speedy trial was violated when his trial was 
delayed eight years with no showing of actual prejudice); see also U.S. v. Ingram, 
446 F.3d 1332, 1340 (11th Cir. 2006) (holding that a two-year delay from 
indictment to trial resulted in a speedy trial violation when the first three factors 
weighed against the State and there was no actual prejudice).  While not every 
lengthy delay results in presumptive prejudice, see State v. Evans, 386 S.C. 418, 
688 S.E.2d 583 (2009) (holding a twelve year delay did not violate the right to 
speedy trial), on this record it appears the State's delay was not merely negligent 
but intentional. Further, there was some evidence of actual prejudice in the 
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discrepancies in the eyewitnesses' testimony.  We hold that Alex met his burden of 
demonstrating prejudice. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
After considering the totality of the circumstances, we hold that the Court of 
Appeals erred in affirming the trial court's ruling that Alex's right to a speedy trial 
was not violated and therefore the Court of Appeals' decision is  
 
REVERSED. 
 
 
BEATTY and HEARN, JJ., concur.  Acting Justice Jean H. Toal, dissenting in 
a separate opinion in which KITTREDGE, J., concurs. 
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ACTING JUSTICE TOAL: I respectfully dissent.  Because I would affirm the 
court of appeals' decision finding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in 
refusing to dismiss the murder charge against Alexander Hunsberger (Petitioner) 
on the basis of the State's failure to provide a speedy trial, I would dismiss the writ 
of certiorari as improvidently granted. 
I. Facts and Procedural Background 
On September 3, 2001, Samuel Sturrup (the victim) was murdered.  The 
State alleged Steven Barnes, Richard Cave, Antonio Griffin, and Charlene 
Thatcher began an assault on the victim in Georgia because Barnes believed the 
victim had stolen money from him.  Barnes called Petitioner and Julio, who drove
from South Carolina to Augusta, where the group placed the victim in the trunk of 
Julio's car. Barnes, Cave, Griffin, and Thatcher followed Petitioner and Julio in 
another car to a remote area of Edgefield County, South Carolina.  When they 
arrived, Barnes ordered everyone in the group to shoot the victim, and Barnes fired 
the fatal shot into the back of the victim's head. 
On January 25, 2002, Petitioner was arrested in South Carolina for the 
murder of the victim and was held without bond.  On March 25, 2002, a grand jury 
indicted Petitioner for murder.  On June 14, 2002, Petitioner was denied bail. 
Another bond hearing was held on April 29, 2004, before the Honorable William
P. Keesley.  While Judge Keesley denied bail, he provided that Petitioner could 
renew his motion if the State failed to try Petitioner during the next term of court.  
On November 17, 2004, Petitioner filed a motion to dismiss the charges against 
him or release him on a personal recognizance bond based upon the State's failure 
to give him a speedy trial, denial of due process, unreasonable confinement 
without bail, and violation of S.C. Code Ann. § 17-23-90.8  Judge Keesley heard 
arguments on the motion in December 2004, and by order filed December 3, 2004, 
Judge Keesley denied the motions.  However, Judge Keesley expressed "deep[] 
concern[] about the length of time that ha[d] transpired without bringing 
[Petitioner] to trial" and noted that "[t]hree years in jail awaiting trial on this charge 
[was] clearly bordering on excessive."  Judge Keesley further offered to create a 
special term of court for the purpose of proceeding with Petitioner's trial in 
February 2005, and in his order, permitted Petitioner to renew his motion if he had 
8 See S.C. Code Ann. § 17-23-90 (2014) (providing for bail and release from
imprisonment should the State fail to prosecute a defendant within a certain time 
frame).
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not been tried by February 2005. The Court "again admonished [the State] that 
unless immediate steps [were] taken to bring this case to trial promptly, the court 
[would] have no option under the constitutions of the United States and South 
Carolina except to release the defendant from jail in South Carolina." 
The State subsequently notified Judge Keesley that it did not intend to try 
the case in February, and Petitioner filed a second speedy trial motion. On January 
28, 2005, Judge Keesley issued an order denying Petitioner's motion to dismiss the 
charges, but granted Petitioner a $50,000 personal recognizance bond.  However, 
Judge Keesley placed a condition on the bond that Petitioner was not to be released 
from custody until Georgia released its hold on Petitioner.  Judge Keesley also 
invited Georgia officials to begin extradition proceedings.  Thereafter, the State 
relinquished custody of Petitioner to Georgia.  Petitioner and Julio were jointly 
tried in Georgia and were convicted of kidnapping in September 2006. They were 
sentenced to life imprisonment. 
After the State obtained a death penalty conviction in Barnes's case in 
November 2010, the State sought to extradite Petitioner to South Carolina in early 
2011. It is unclear when exactly Petitioner was extradited to South Carolina; 
however, Petitioner proceeded to trial on January 3, 2012.  During pre-trial 
motions, Petitioner sought to have his South Carolina charges dismissed because 
the State had violated his constitutional right to a speedy trial. The trial court 
denied the motion, and Petitioner appealed.  The court of appeals affirmed.  See 
State v. Alexander L. Hunsberger, Op. No. 2014-UP-381 (S.C. Ct. App. filed Nov. 
5, 2014). We granted certiorari to consider Petitioner's claim that he was denied 
his constitutional right to a speedy trial. 
II. Analysis 
"In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy . . 
. trial." U.S. Const. amend. VI; see also S.C. Const. art. I, § 14 ("Any person 
charged with an offense shall enjoy the right to a speedy . . . trial.").  The right has 
been described as "necessarily relative," in that "[i]t is consistent with delays and 
depends upon circumstances."  State v. Langford, 400 S.C. 421, 441, 735 S.E.2d 
471, 481 (2012) (quoting Beavers v. Haubert, 198 U.S. 77 (1905)). In other words, 
"[a] speedy trial does not mean an immediate one; it does not imply undue haste, 
for the [S]tate, too, is entitled to a reasonable time in which to prepare its case; it  
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simply means a trial without unreasonable and unnecessary delay."  Id. at 441, 735 
S.E.2d at 481–82 (quoting Wheeler v. State, 247 S.C. 393, 400, 147 S.E.2d 627, 
630 (1966)). 
Even though the United States Supreme Court has provided that speedy trial 
issues should be resolved on an ad hoc basis, the Court has identified several 
factors to be considered when deciding speedy trial issues, including: (1) the length 
of the delay; (2) the reason(s) the government provides to justify the delay; (3) the 
timing of the defendant's assertion of his right to speedy trial; and (4) the prejudice 
resulting to the defendant.  Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 530 (1972); see also 
State v. Foster, 260 S.C. 511, 197 S.E.2d 280 (1973) (recognizing Barker factors 
as applicable under South Carolina law).  The Supreme Court has explained that 
not one of these factors is "either a necessary or sufficient condition to the finding 
of a deprivation of the right of speedy trial." Barker, 407 U.S. at 533. Rather, the 
factors are interrelated and "must be considered along 'with such other 
circumstances as may be relevant.'"  Langford, 400 S.C. at 441, 735 S.E.2d at 482 
(quoting Barker, 407 U.S. at 533).  Thus, courts should weigh "'the conduct of both 
the prosecution and the defense.'"  Id. at 441–42, 735 S.E.2d at 482 (quoting 
Barker, 407 U.S. at 529–30).   
The "triggering mechanism" of the Barker analysis is the length of the delay. 
Id. at 442, 735 S.E.2d at 482 (citing Barker, 407 U.S. at 530). When a defendant 
asserts his speedy trial right, the court "should not even examine the remaining 
factors '[u]ntil there is some delay which is presumptively prejudicial.'"  Id.
(quoting Barker, 407 U.S. at 530).  "The clock starts running on a defendant's
speedy trial right when he is 'indicted, arrested, or otherwise officially accused,' 
and therefore we are to include the time between arrest and indictment."  Id.
(quoting United States v. MacDonald, 456 U.S. 1, 6 (1982)).  Notably, however, 
"even the length of time necessary to trigger the full inquiry 'is necessarily 
dependent upon the peculiar circumstances of the case.'"  Id. (quoting Barker, 407 
U.S. at 530–31). Further, the Supreme Court has explained that "as the term is 
used in this threshold context, 'presumptive prejudice' does not necessarily indicate 
a statistical probability of prejudice; it simply marks the point at which courts 
deem the delay unreasonable enough to trigger the Barker enquiry."  Doggett v. 
United States, 505 U.S. 647, 652, n.1 (1992). 
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A. Triggering Factor and Length of Delay 
I agree with the majority and the court of appeals that Petitioner's 
incarceration South Carolina from January 2002 until January 2005 is 
presumptively prejudicial and therefore triggers further analysis into the causes of 
the delay using the Barker factors. See id.; State v. Waites, 270 S.C. 104, 108, 240 
S.E.2d 651, 653 (1978) (finding a two year, four month delay was sufficient to 
trigger further review of the Barker factors).  I also agree with the majority's 
analysis of the length of time factor within the context of the Barker inquiry. 
Under the majority's formulation, the State is responsible for an eight-year delay in 
prosecuting Petitioner. I disagree, however, with how the majority analyzed the 
delay within the context of the remaining Barker factors.
B. Reason for Delay
In assessing this element, this Court has interpreted Barker as follows: 
The ultimate responsibility for the trial of a criminal defendant rests 
with the State. Barker, 407 U.S. at 531. Therefore, the court should 
weigh heavily against the State any intentional delays to impede the 
defense. Id. Where the reason for the delay is more neutral, the court 
should weigh it less heavily against the State. Id. A valid reason 
presented by the State may justify an appropriate delay. Id. However, 
the Court must also consider and weigh the defendant's contribution to 
the delay in determining whether the defendant's Sixth Amendment 
rights have been violated. Waites, 270 S.C. at 108, 240 S.E.2d at 653 
(holding defendant's contribution to the delay of the trial militated 
against a finding of a violation of the right to a speedy trial).
State v. Pittman, 373 S.C. 527, 549, 647 S.E.2d 144, 155 (2007). 
As noted by the majority, the State has provided the following reasons for 
the delay: (1) the complexity of the case; (2) the fact that there were two separate 
jurisdictions endeavoring to prosecute Petitioner; (3) the need to collect witnesses; 
and (4) the decision to seek the death penalty in Petitioner's case.  The majority 
finds that this was a simple crime, and therefore, to the extent the court of appeals 
found it to be complex, the court of appeals erred.  In my opinion, this case was  
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unique in that it required a great deal of coordination within the Solicitor's office 
and amongst the jurisdictions to pursue these prosecutions.  As astutely explained 
by the trial judge: 
It's a rather unique case for a lot of reasons. It's unique in the sense 
that you have cross-border issues, you have Georgia wanting to 
pursue Georgia's case, but South Carolina wanting to pursue South 
Carolina's cases, each defendant asserting their individual 
constitutional rights and the State having a capital case that [it is] 
wanting to pursue and [has] successfully pursued. So this case doesn't
follow the normal framework of cases where a person is—has a 
charge outstanding and simply wants to get it tried, wants to get it 
over with. This is a case that has a number of complicated factors that 
bring us to this moment in time. 
The trial judge found that the State had "demonstrated legitimate reasons for the 
delay given the complex nature of the cases, [and] the problems involving 
prosecutions in multiple jurisdictions in this state as well as the State of Georgia."   
In my opinion, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding the State 
presented legitimate reason for the delay.  See, e.g., State v. Kennedy, 339 S.C. 
243, 250, 528 S.E.2d 700, 704 (Ct. App. 2000) ("While Kennedy asserted his right 
to a speedy trial fourteen months prior to the commencement of his trial, the case 
was clearly complicated and required substantial time to investigate and prepare. 
Further, there is an absence of evidence in this case that the State purposefully 
delayed Kennedy's trial. Finally, we conclude the prejudice to Kennedy, if any, is 
minimal.").  Here, the State was dealing with the potential for six separate 
prosecutions (one of which involved the State seeking the death penalty and two 
that involved the possibility of the death penalty); the various defendants were 
asked to be witnesses in the other cases; and the crime occurred in two states, both 
of which were seeking to prosecute the defendants.9 In light of these unique facts, 
9 Ultimately, the Hunsbergers and Barnes were released to Georgia to stand trial 
prior to their trials in South Carolina.  Barnes received a life sentence in Georgia 
for crimes related to running a prostitution ring separate from this murder.  The 
Hunsbergers were both convicted of kidnapping in Georgia and received life 
sentences. Cave, Griffon, and Thatcher all pleaded guilty to aggravated assault in 
Georgia and received eighteen-year sentences.  Barnes and the Hunsbergers were 
then prosecuted in South Carolina. 
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it is my opinion that the court of appeals did not err in upholding the trial court's 
finding that the reasons given for the delay were reasonable.  See Pittman, 373 S.C. 
at 552, 647 S.E.2d at 156–57 ("The record does not reflect any intentional or 
malicious delays by the prosecution, nor does the record reflect any negligent 
prosecutorial behavior in connection with this case. Additionally, the delays 
attributable to the defense were also reasonable in light of the circumstances of this 
case. Although it took a long time for the case to come to trial, any delay was the 
result of the complexities of this case. The justifications for the delay offered by 
both parties in this case weigh in favor of a finding that Appellant was not deprived 
of his right to a speedy trial."). 
C. Accused's Assertion of the Right to a Speedy Trial 
Unlike the majority, I would find that Petitioner's assertion of his speedy 
trial right in November 2004 and January 2005 is not dispositive under the facts of 
this case. In response to Petitioner's assertion of the speedy trial right in 
conjunction with his motions for bail, Petitioner was granted relief under section 
17-23-90 in the form of a personal recognizance bond.  See State v. Campbell, 277 
S.C. 408, 288 S.E.2d 395 (1982) (denying speedy trial claim where section 17-23-
90 provides for release if not indicted and tried within a certain time frame, not 
dismissal of the charge).  Petitioner did not again assert his speedy trial right until 
his trial in January 2012. At this point Petitioner had been prosecuted in Georgia 
and incarcerated there for seven years (from January 2005 until January 2012).  In 
my opinion, Petitioner's failure to assert his right during this time period weighs 
against him. See Waites, 270 S.C. at 108, 240 S.E.2d at 653 (noting "the manner in 
which the defendant asserts his right [to a speedy trial] is an important factor to be 
considered" when analyzing whether a defendant speedy trial motion should be 
granted, and Barker "'emphasize[d] that failure to assert the right will make it 
difficult for a defendant to prove that he was denied a speedy trial.'" (quoting 
Barker, 407 U.S. at 532))); State v. Foster, 260 S.C. 511, 197 S.E.2d 280 (1973) 
("The record offers no reason for the failure of the defendants to assert their right 
sooner, and under [Barker], a failure to assert the right will make it difficult for the
defendants to prove that they were denied a speedy trial").10 
10 In my opinion, it can be inferred from the record that Petitioner did not, in fact, 
want a speedy trial. See Barker, 407 U.S. at 536 (stating, where the defendant did 
not object to the Commonwealth of Kentucky seeking sixteen separate 
continuances in his trial date, "barring extraordinary circumstances, we [should] be 
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  Therefore, in my opinion the majority erroneously weighs this factor 
against the State. 
D. Prejudice 
Petitioner argues that he was prejudiced by the passage of time because the 
witnesses' memories were impaired.  The trial court found Petitioner's right to a 
fair trial was not impacted by the delay and therefore no prejudice resulted, in that 
every witness was still available to testify, the prior transcripts were available to 
Petitioner for impeachment purposes and to refresh the witnesses' recollections, 
and in fact Petitioner did "an effective job at pointing out to the witnesses in cross-
examining them and impeaching them on prior inconsistent statements."
Significantly, as noted by the court of appeals, Petitioner "did not allege any 
witnesses or evidence were lost, the delay impacted his case, or an earlier trial 
would have resulted in a different verdict and sentence."  See Hunsberger, Op. No. 
2014-UP-381. However, the majority asserts that the mere passage of time is 
enough to find prejudice in this case.  I disagree. See Pittman, 373 S.C. at 551, 647 
S.E.2d at 156 (rejecting Pittman's argument that a delay of three years, two months 
between arrest and trial was so lengthy that it was presumptively prejudicial); 
Foster, 260 S.C. at 515, 197 S.E.2d at 281 (finding a delay of more than five years 
was sufficient to require analysis of the other factors without finding presumptive 
prejudice). 
This Court has noted that "the most serious interest to be protected by the 
guarantee to a speedy trial is the possibility of impairment of the defense."  
Pittman, 373 S.C. at 550, 647 S.E.2d at 155–56.  In Doggett, the United States 
Supreme Court has also observed that: 
Unreasonable delay between formal accusation and trial threatens to 
produce more than one sort of harm, including 'oppressive pretrial 
reluctant indeed to rule that a defendant was denied this constitutional right on a 
record that strongly indicates, as does this one, that the defendant did not want a 
speedy trial." (emphasis added)).  Petitioner testified that one of the reasons he did 
not want to be extradited to South Carolina was that he "needed to find out" how 
extradition would affect his Georgia appeal.  In addition, the record indicates that 
the State was considering seeking the death penalty against Petitioner, which might 
explain Petitioner's failure to assert his speedy trial right during his Georgia 
incarceration.  
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incarceration,' 'anxiety and concern of the accused,' and 'the 
possibility that the [accused's] defense will be impaired' by dimming 
memories and loss of exculpatory evidence.  
505 U.S. at 654 (quoting Barker, 407 U.S. at 532). Under the circumstances of this 
case, where Petitioner was serving a life sentence in Georgia, it is my opinion that 
the pretrial incarceration and anxiety concerns were minimal.11  Most, importantly, 
the delay did not in any way impair his defense.  In fact, the delay may have 
worked to Petitioner's advantage.  The Supreme Court has explained this paradox 
as follows: 
The right to a speedy trial is generically different from any of the 
other rights enshrined in the Constitution for the protection of the 
accused. In addition to the general concern that all accused persons be 
treated according to decent and fair procedures, there is a societal 
interest in providing a speedy trial which exists separate from, and at 
times in opposition to, the interests of the accused . . . . 
11 In making this finding, the majority claims I ignore the Supreme Court's holding 
in Smith v. Hooey, 393 U.S. 374 (1969). There, the Supreme Court noted that 
incarceration in another jurisdiction "can have fully as depressive an effect upon a 
prisoner as upon a person who is at large."  Id. at 378. In my opinion, this case is 
distinguishable. As one federal court has explained: 
Smith involved a prisoner who remained in federal custody for six 
years during which the State of Texas ignored his repeated requests to 
be brought to trial on an outstanding state charge. The Supreme Court 
there rejected the argument propounded by Texas that federalism
concerns and respect for equal sovereigns barred it from seeking to try 
a defendant in federal custody even when that defendant vociferously 
and repeatedly requested to be tried as quickly as possible. Thus, the 
Supreme Court, as it made clear in Barker, attaches significant weight 
in the balance of interests that is dispositive of speedy trial claims to a 
defendant's assertion or failure to assert his speedy trial right with 
respect to an outstanding charge. 
United States v. Wade, No. 08-CR-0120 LAK, 2015 WL 4475178, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. 
July 22, 2015) (footnotes omitted).  Here, unlike in Smith, Petitioner never once 
asserted his speedy trial right while incarcerated in Georgia. 
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A second difference between the right to speedy trial and the 
accused's other constitutional rights is that deprivation of the right 
may work to the accused's advantage. Delay is not an uncommon 
defense tactic. As the time between the commission of the crime and 
trial lengthens, witnesses may become unavailable or their memories 
may fade. If the witnesses support the prosecution, its case will be 
weakened, sometimes seriously so. And it is the prosecution which 
carries the burden of proof. Thus, unlike the right to counsel or the 
right to be free from compelled self-in-crimination, deprivation of the 
right to speedy trial does not per se prejudice the accused's ability to 
defend himself. 
 Barker, 407 U.S. at 521. 
 I see two benefits accruing to Petitioner's defense as a result of the passage 
of time in this case.  First, as the trial judge pointed out, Petitioner was able to 
cross-examine and impeach the witnesses using their prior testimony.  Second, as 
the court of appeals pointed out, Petitioner "may have received a benefit as a result 
of the delay because the State ultimately decided not to pursue the death penalty 
against him." State v. Hunsberger, Op. No. 2014-UP-381; see State v. Cooper, 386 
S.C. 210, 218, 687 S.E.2d 62, 67 (Ct. App. 2009) (noting because the State 
withdrew its notice to seek the death penalty, "the withdrawal could be construed 
as a benefit to Cooper resulting from the delay."). Because I cannot identify any 
prejudice befalling Petitioner as a result of the delay, I would find the trial court 
did not abuse its discretion when assessing this factor.  See Langford, 400 S.C. at 
445, 735 S.E.2d at 484 (finding a two-year delay in bringing the case to trial did 
not amount to a constitutional violation in the absence of any actual prejudice to 
the defendant's case); State v. Brazell, 325 S.C. 65, 76, 480 S.E.2d 64, 70–71 
(1997) (noting the three-year-and-five-month delay was negated by the lack of 
prejudice to the defense); Kennedy, 339 S.C. at 251, 528 S.E.2d at 704 ("While 
Kennedy may have been slightly prejudiced by the twenty-six month pretrial 
incarceration, the more important question is whether he was prejudiced because 
the delay impaired his defense.").  
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III. Conclusion 
No single Barker factor is "either a necessary or sufficient condition to the 
finding of a deprivation of the right of speedy trial."  Barker, 407 U.S. at 533.  
Rather, the factors are interrelated and "must be considered along 'with such other 
circumstances as may be relevant.'"  Langford, 400 S.C. at 441, 735 S.E.2d at 482 
(quoting Barker, 407 U.S. at 533).  Under this particular constellation of facts, I 
would hold that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to dismiss the 
charges against Petitioner, and consequently, the court of appeals did not err in 
upholding the trial court's finding that Petitioner's speedy trial right was not 
violated. Accordingly, I would dismiss the writ of certiorari as improvidently 
granted. 
KITTREDGE, J., concurs. 
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The Supreme Court of South Carolina
  
In the Matter of Darryl D. Smalls, Respondent. 
 
Appellate Case No. 2016-002070 

Appellate Case No. 2016-002071 

ORDER 
The Office of Disciplinary Counsel petitions this Court to place respondent on 
interim suspension pursuant to Rule 17 of the Rules for Lawyer Disciplinary 
Enforcement (RLDE) contained in Rule 413 of the South Carolina Appellate Court 
Rules (SCACR). The petition also seeks appointment of the Receiver, Peyre T. 
Lumpkin, Esquire, pursuant to Rule 31, RLDE.   
IT IS ORDERED that respondent's license to practice law in this state is suspended 
until further order of this Court. 
Respondent is hereby enjoined from taking any action regarding any trust, escrow, 
operating, and any other law office account(s) respondent may maintain at any 
bank or other financial institution including, but not limited to, making any 
withdrawal or transfer, or writing any check or other instrument on the account(s).   
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Peyre T. Lumpkin, Esquire, is hereby appointed 
to assume responsibility for respondent's client files, trust account(s), escrow 
account(s), operating account(s), and any other law office accounts respondent 
may maintain. Mr. Lumpkin shall take action as required by Rule 31, RLDE, to 
protect the interests of respondent's clients.  Mr. Lumpkin may make 
disbursements from respondent's trust account(s), escrow account(s), operating 
account(s), and any other law office accounts respondent may maintain that are 
necessary to effectuate this appointment.  Respondent shall promptly respond to
Mr. Lumpkin's requests for information and/or documentation and shall fully 
cooperate with Mr. Lumpkin in all other respects.   
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 Further, this Order, when served on any bank or other financial institution 
maintaining trust, escrow and/or operating account(s) of respondent, shall serve as 
an injunction to prevent respondent from making withdrawals from the account(s) 
and shall further serve as notice to the bank or other financial institution that Peyre 
T. Lumpkin, Esquire, has been duly appointed by this Court. 
 
This Order, when served on any office of the United States Postal Service, shall 
serve as notice that Peyre T. Lumpkin, Esquire, has been duly appointed by this 
Court and has the authority to receive respondent's mail and the authority to direct 
that respondent's mail be delivered to Mr. Lumpkin's office. 
 
Mr. Lumpkin's appointment shall be for a period of no longer than nine months 
unless an extension of the period of appointment is requested. 
 
Finally, within fifteen (15) days of the date of this order, respondent shall serve 
and file the affidavit required by Rule 30, RLDE.  Should respondent fail to timely 
file the required affidavit, respondent may be held in civil and/or criminal 
contempt of this Court as provided by Rule 30, RLDE.    
 
 
s/ Costa M. Pleicones  C.J. 
 
 
Columbia, South Carolina 
 
October 10, 2016 
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The Supreme Court of South Carolina 
Amendment to Rule 31(g) and (h) of the Rules for 
Lawyer Disciplinary Enforcement, Rule 413, SCACR  
 
Appellate Case No. 2015-001286 
ORDER 
By order dated September 28, 2016, the Court amended Rule 31(g) and (h) of the 
Rules for Lawyer Disciplinary Enforcement (RLDE) contained in Rule 413 of the 
South Carolina Appellate Court Rules (SCACR).  The order contained a scrivener's 
error inadvertently leaving out a portion of the text not affected by the amendment.  
Rule 31(g) and (h), RLDE, as amended, are stated in full below:
(g) Termination of Receivership. When the provisions of (d) above and the 
order of receivership have been complied with, the receiver shall apply to 
the Supreme Court for termination of the receivership. The application shall 
contain the written releases of clients to whom files and other property were 
returned, information regarding the efforts made to contact the lawyer's 
remaining clients, an inventory of the files and other property remaining in
the receiver's possession, an itemized account of the expenses incurred in 
carrying out the order of receivership, and documentation of time spent by 
the receiver and the receiver's staff in carrying out the order of receivership.  
The Supreme Court may order the lawyer to reimburse the receiver for 
expenses incurred and time spent in carrying out the order of receivership. 
Expenses and fees for the receiver and the receiver's staff time which are 
approved and awarded by the Supreme Court shall be paid from funds 
remaining in the lawyer's accounts.  If either no such funds exist or the 
remaining funds are insufficient, the Supreme Court may direct that payment 
be made from the Lawyers' Fund for Client Protection.  If the receiver's
expenses or fees are paid by the Lawyers' Fund for Client Protection, the 
Supreme Court may order the lawyer to reimburse that Fund.  Upon 
approval of the application by the Supreme Court, all files and property 
remaining in the receiver's possession shall be retained by the Commission.  
Unless otherwise ordered by the Supreme Court, the files shall be retained 
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by the Commission for a period of 3 years at which time they shall be 
destroyed in a manner which protects their confidentiality.  Other client 
property remaining in the possession of the Commission after 3 years shall 
be disposed of in a manner as ordered by the Supreme Court.   
(h) Appointment of Attorneys to Assist the Receiver.  Upon petition of 
the receiver, the Supreme Court may appoint members of the South Carolina 
Bar as needed to assist the receiver in performing duties under this rule.  
With the exception of reasonable and necessary expenses, such as postage, 
telephone bills, copies, supplies and the cost of publishing legal notice in the 
newspaper, an appointed attorney shall serve without compensation as a 
service to the legal profession.  However, the Supreme Court may order that 
the appointed attorney be reimbursed a reasonable amount for other 
expenses, such as the appointed attorney's time or the time of support staff, 
when it determines that extraordinary time and services were necessary for 
the completion of the required duties or when the appointment has worked a 
substantial hardship on the appointed attorney's practice. The Supreme Court 
shall determine the reasonableness of necessary expenses and other 
expenses. Expenses which are approved and awarded by the Supreme Court 
shall be paid from funds remaining in the lawyer's accounts.1  If either no 
such funds exist or the remaining funds are insufficient, the Supreme Court
may direct that payment be made from the Lawyers' Fund for Client 
Protection.  If the appointed attorney's expenses are paid by the Lawyers' 
Fund for Client Protection, the Supreme Court may order the lawyer to 
reimburse that Fund.   
1 For purposes of this rule, the following rates are currently established for 
reimbursement of fees, expenses, and the costs of copies but are subject to change 
at the discretion of the Court.  
Receiver and Attorneys to Assist the 
Receiver Fees $75.00 per hour 
Receiver Staff and Other Support Staff $15.00 per hour 
Copies $ 0.15 per page
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s/ Costa M. Pleicones  C.J. 
 
 
 
October 12, 2016 
Columbia, South Carolina 
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